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Interview with William D. Broderick

The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

WILLIAM D. BRODERICK

Interviewed by: Henry B. Ryan

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BRODERICK: I have urged Ambassador Henderson to tell about his experiences. One reason I thought he should write a book, particularly about his Bolivian experience, is that he had a remarkable background that few others had. He had served in Bolivia from about, I believe, 1941 to '42 as a junior officer involved in efforts to control German access to rubber and other strategic materials. Later, in addition of course, he served as Ambassador to Bolivia around the times of President Paz and President Barrientos, the revolution of 1964, and the Che Guevara business. However, I gather he has not written a memoir and probably doesn't intend to, which is unfortunate. It will have to be reconstructed from the historical records.

Regarding Che Guevara, I was actually out of Bolivia when the Guevara phenomenon surfaced in early 1967. I was deputy director of the Office of Bolivia/Chile Affairs at the time and in March 1967 made a trip first to Chile and then to Bolivia. On arrival in La Paz, Ambassador Henderson invited me to join him and the AID mission director—I'm not sure if the DCM was there or not—at a meeting with the then co-presidents, Generals Barrientos and Ovando at Barrientos's home where breakfast, which consisted of cold fried eggs, was served. What we got which was much better than the eggs was a marvelously fantastic story. The two generals had with them a young Bolivian soldier who told of

having been with an army unit that had been captured by these guerrillas at a time when it had not been established that Che Guevara was in the group or the leader of the group, although there were many rumors about it.

According to the man, there were several hundred in the group that surrounded them and captured them. Among other things, they were able to survive in the wilderness because they had special pills they could take which satisfied their hunger needs so they would not have to have provisions with them. They had doctors and nurses with them to care for anyone who was injured. These guerrillas held the group for several hours before he was either released or escaped, I don't remember which. The main thrust of his story was that this was a tremendously large, well-organized and well-led group of guerrillas that really threatened the future of Bolivia.

We heard the story; the generals looked at us and we looked at each other and the generals said, “Well, what do you think?” We tried to keep from laughing. The generals divided us, Barrientos took Henderson, Ovando took Bob Hurwitch, the DCM, who I now remember was there.

Q: This was a divided presidency?

BRODERICK: Ovando was the commander of the army, Barrientos had been chief of the air force. Just those two generals were present. Each had the title of Co-President.

Q: What was your job at that time?

BRODERICK: Deputy Director of the office of Chilean/Bolivian Affairs in Washington. So as the visiting dignitary, it gave me status that I never had when I was there as economic counselor of the embassy. Well, after hearing the story one co-president took Henderson and the other Hurwitch and I was sort of left to fend for myself. Each of them separately made pitches for financial and military assistance. Now there had been some kind of CIA assistance to Bolivia in periods there, and Barrientos, in particular, knew about it and may

have even benefitted from it, so they knew it was possible. The whole point of giving this cock-and-bull story was to provide some kind of rational or motivation for getting large scale US assistance.

Q: Did they want money, equipment, troops, or all the above?

BRODERICK: Based on my memory, I can't tell you for sure, and given what subsequently happened, it was probably all three. They did get Green Beret types who came down and trained them. The real problem with the guerrillas was not how many there were, but the absolute incompetence and lack of equipment of the Bolivian army. These poor peasant privates had rifles that would not fire, and they were barefoot. This was by-and-large not because the Bolivian army did not have this kind of equipment, but because it was all plundered by higher ups as it came down the line.

Q: What would they do with it? Sell it to somebody else?

BRODERICK: Yes, the military were selling it. In the case of rations they were most likely selling it on the black market. I don't know what they did with the equipment, perhaps kept it back in headquarters companies that did not risk having to go into battle and lose the equipment.

In any case, that was my only direct contact with the Guevara phenomenon except for the subsequent story of the captured material. It was later verified that it was in fact Guevara and also that the number of people that he had with him in this band was never higher than twenty-five or so, of whom three or four possibly, were Cubans. The fascinating thing that came out about Guevara and the Bolivian peasantry was that in the face of his expectation that he could generate a popular uprising against this military government, he found, first of all, that a large number of the peasants in that area had benefitted in some degree from the land reform of the 50's when the MNR came into power, so they were not looking for any major changes. The second thing was that Guevara and his cohorts

were regarded as foreigners and were referred to by the Bolivian peasantry as “gringos” because they spoke with this very strange accent.

Q: Did the peasantry speak Quechue or Spanish?

BRODERICK: Down there in the Santa Cruz area largely, they would probably not be Quechue but Aymara, but they were also Spanish speaking. Subsequently the Bolivian army did come across a cave in which this group had been staying and they did find a miscellaneous bunch of material, including a passport which the leader of the group had carried. This was taken over by the Bolivian army. At the urging of the US, the Bolivian government reluctantly agreed to send it up to Washington for evaluation—primarily to determine if it was Guevara. The experts in the field were comparing photographs of him where he had shaved his beard and his hair and so forth. They were looking at things such as the size of ear lobes to see if this was the same one. They finally concluded it was the same person. The Bolivians wanted their materials back; they had itemized them all very carefully, and when we sent them back in La Paz the government had protested that there was one item missing and what had happened to it? That item was a cigar butt. So we asked CIA what had happened to the cigar butt and the answer came back, “Consumed in analysis”. We did not hear any more about it.

So that is the extent of my knowledge of the Che Guevara matter.

Q: There are a couple of questions I would like to ask you in that regard. You mentioned that the CIA had been helping before Barrientos came to power. What kind of help was that?

BRODERICK: To my knowledge it was financial. Victor Paz was getting it.

Q: What were they worried about then, was there evidence of guerrilla activity before the Guevara episode?

BRODERICK: That whole area is an arcane mystery to me as to why we ever do those things. It was not for guerrilla purposes; it was just general support for this MNR government whose policies we were favoring.

Q: MNR?

BRODERICK: Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario, which was the party Victor Paz had first led to power in 1952; it stayed in power until 1964 until he was ousted by the military. He had been in and out of office and other party leaders had also been president.

Q: Was there general support for the government?

BRODERICK: Yes, this was a period in which, in the early '60s, we were giving through the AID program huge amounts of assistance, including budget support, in return for the Bolivian government giving certain assurances about controlling expenditures and so forth. The AID program, the total package, was running at 30-40 million dollars a year. But this other assistance was run totally separate from the AID business and it was not public knowledge. In fact I only knew about it by hearing things about it. Economic counselors were not supposed to be parties to that sort of stuff.

Q: I was also interested in your remarks about Guevara and the peasantry. Was it your impression that Guevara was trying to stimulate an uprising in Bolivia among the peasantry?

BRODERICK: Oh yes, that is why he came. He totally misjudged the revolutionary atmosphere in Bolivia because, after all, there had been the MNR revolutionary government in existence for over twelve years. In those days we, meaning the US government, had in Bolivia a policy model for Latin America; here was one “revolutionary” government that was not communist that we could support and for once be on the side of the good guys and not with the entrenched reactionary generals. I remember I advanced this thesis once in an ARA staff meeting when Lincoln Gordon was assistant secretary.

Well, he nearly pushed me through the floor. His idea of a model was Brazil. So I never raised the subject again, and almost ceased to believe it as I saw how Bolivia developed.

Q: It was a model even though the two people leading it were generals?

BRODERICK: The model prior to the generals coming in was a civilian government and we were hoping at this period to sort of remake the generals and make them into good guys. After the coup d'etat had occurred and Paz left they were all very green at government. We had been telling them before the coup occurred, that we had knowledge of their plans and that they should not overthrow a constitutional government. This is our standard approach (though I'm not sure we followed it in Brazil). After the coup was over they came around and wanted to know “How do we get back in your good graces?”

They could not meet at the ambassador's residence because we had not yet recognized them so they would meet in different places. One time they came to my house in La Paz and were sitting around. We were giving a little seminar to them on how to run a government. My main memory of it was the Minister of Defense. He was a very short man, and a colonel (as they all were). He was sitting on one of my chairs and his feet did not reach the floor.

Q: You became the economic counselor then?

BRODERICK: I was assigned to La Paz as economic counselor in 1963 and as part of that job got heavily involved in the program to rehabilitate the Bolivian tin mine industry. The organization was known as COMIBOL, Corporacion Minera de Bolivia, a governmental agency—they had nationalized all the mines. While it was not specifically the job of the economic counselor to worry about, I did see that this was one of the major problems we and others were facing so I involved myself in it along with people in the AID mission. After I had been there two years, the deputy AID director left and at Ambassador Henderson's request I was made deputy AID director. I left in mid-1966 to come back to Washington to

become the director of Bolivian/Chilean Affairs. Which is when I had the Guevara-related experiences.

Q: Did you go back to Bolivia on assignment?

BRODERICK: No.

Q: Do you know why, after we established the ranger battalion trained by Green Berets, we had two Cuban Americans with the troops and two Cuban Americans in La Paz? Was there some reason?

BRODERICK: I don't know, I presume it was just fluency in Spanish, but there could have been other reasons. I don't know of any Cuban Americans in the embassy—there may have been some with the military mission.

Q: You mentioned finding the materials, including the cigar, in the guerrilla camp. I understand from Ambassador Henderson that the discovery of those items kicked off a great row between the CIA and DIA back in Washington. Apparently the military representatives in our embassy heard about it from the Bolivian military and forgot to report it to the ambassador and to the State Department, which caused some rather hard feelings, particularly in Washington. Did you come across this?

BRODERICK: No, I was not aware of that. My recollection of it was that by the time I knew of it there had been an agreement that it would go to CIA for analysis.

Q: Was there pressure in Washington during that period for a tougher reaction? Ambassador Henderson was trying to keep this very contained, it seems to me. Did that suit Washington? I have had some indications that there were people here who wanted to take a stronger position and clean it up quicker.

BRODERICK: I just don't know that. The principle individual involved on that type of matter was Bob Sayre. I don't know if anybody has interviewed him.

Q: I have requested an interview with him and hope to talk to him. There was also a fee of five million dollars to the Bolivians. Did you run across that? It was to be payment for taking part in this.

BRODERICK: The head of Bolivian/Chilean Affairs at that time was Pat Morris who was actually an AID employee. It was during the period when State and AID had this agreement for sort of interchangeability on certain jobs. He is here in the Washington area, and lives in Bethesda. A lot of the stuff involved with CIA he handled and we did not know what was going on there.

Q: It was Ambassador Henderson's first and last ambassadorship. Was State pleased with his handling of things? He said they had a hard time placing him when he got back to Washington.

BRODERICK: There was tension between him and State. It is not uncommon. Ambassadors in the field see things differently than headquarters does. My own conviction is that he was left there too long and only came out when his wife died, which was a tragic situation. He was, in fact, in an earlier period, being considered for other ambassadorial appointments. I remember being asked to go over to the White House in 1967 or so, because he was on the list at least for the ambassadorship to Argentina. The fellow I talked to in the White House was just asking questions about Henderson and his performance and so forth. I think he had tremendous loyalty and admiration from his staff. But we also felt the place was getting him down; he had been there four years or so. He was also at one point was being considered as ambassador to Uruguay, but that did not go through either. On another occasion when he came up on consultation he told us he had been offered the job as head of the Council of Americas, as it was then called, a private business organization. He had turned them down—I told him he was

crazy, he should have taken it. Nelson Rockefeller ran the thing and he was interviewed by Rockefeller. He was still ambassador to Bolivia, but he had been there a good while. I think that by the time he came back from Bolivia the hierarchy in ARA were not really looking benignly on him as an ambassadorial candidate again.

Q: Do you know why?

BRODERICK: I just think that hackles had been aroused on a kind of personal basis. You might ask Sayre that. I don't think that any love was lost between him and Sayre, for example. I do think that if there was any basis for their thinking that he should not get another assignment it was that there was too much “localitis” in his work, which basically meant that he presumed to talk back to Washington and they do not always like that.

Q: What I would like to do here is to talk, not only about your career, but your early days. I am interested in the background of people in these interviews, where they come from, where they grew up and went to school.

BRODERICK: I was born in Detroit in 1924 and attended parochial schools through high school. I then went to the University of Detroit and then in the Army for three years. When I came back I finished my undergraduate degree using the GI bill.

Q: When were you in the Army?

BRODERICK: World War II, 1943-45.

Q: Where were you?

BRODERICK: I was in Italy and France. I arrived in Salerno nine days after the invasion and went up to Anzio, got wounded up there, then went on the invasion of Southern France in August of 1944. I got up into Eastern France, the Vosges mountains, where I

contracted a case of hepatitis which hospitalized me for about four months. They then put me in the Air Corps, which I thought was a splendid change.

Q: What had you been in?

BRODERICK: I had been in the infantry. The Texas National Guard division, the 36th Division, which by the time the war had ended did not have an awful lot of Texans left in it.

Q: It did not matter you were a Detroiter?

BRODERICK: For awhile, but there were enough of us so that we could hold our own with the natives. In the Air Corps I was stationed at a small air field just outside of Paris for about six months, which was very nice. Then when I came back home I started college again in January of 1946 at the University of Detroit. While I was there, probably in late 1948 to early 1949 I saw this notice on the bulletin board about Foreign Service examinations. I had never heard of the Foreign Service particularly. Oh, I had, I had spent a summer while I was in college in Mexico City because my college major was Spanish, both undergraduate and graduate degrees. We were aware there was somebody in the embassy that dealt with veterans' affairs, and that was about it.

It sounded interesting so I applied to take the exam. In those days it was a long three or four day exam. I had to go to Chicago; Detroit was not considered important enough. I took it and passed that exam and came down to Washington in the spring of 1950 and passed the oral. They said, “Well, you are going to have to wait a while, there is this great backlog.” On graduation I had taken a job teaching in high school in a working-class suburb of Detroit. I taught for two years and got called in January of 1951. I actually left my teaching job with some reluctance because I was enjoying it. But I figured that I had to try the Foreign Service, at least. I went through junior officer training and was assigned to Medellin, which in those days was known as the orchid capital of the world.

Q: The orchid capital of the world!

BRODERICK: Yes, in those days it used to export substantial quantities of orchids to Miami. Medellin is the center of a big orchid growing area.

At the time of my arrival in Medellin only the principal officer, the consul, was there. I was the only other officer because the other vice consul was on home leave. So I was in charge of everything, since the consul had pretty much decided that he did not need to work much any more. One of the things I had to do was write the annual report on pulse crops—so the first thing I had to do was find out what a pulse crop was. (It is beans and peas and things like that.) So I went around to the local statistical bureau and asked, “How many beans did you grow last year?”, and he gave me the numbers, so many thousand. I said, “Tell me, how do you do compile this list?” He said, “Well at the beginning of the growing season every year we send a memo to all our regional offices to ask them what is the size of the anticipated crop this year? We get the data and send it in to Bogota. I asked if they ever follow through to see if that is what actually happened? The answer was no. That is how I learned about statistics in underdeveloped countries.

Q: What were the main policy thrusts in Colombia and particularly in Medellin at that point?

BRODERICK: At that point we were very little involved in Medellin in policy affairs. In 1948 there had been the famous Bogotazo as it was called. A leader of a leftist political party had been assassinated, which resulted in tremendous riots in the city of Bogota and around the country. One result of this was a conservative government was in power in 1957, ruling by decree, and our relations with Colombia were friendly, but distant. We had very little involvement with the embassy. One involvement I had was that Ambassador Beaulac was there at the time and he had written a book which was called Career Minister. I had read it and thought it was a pretty good book, at least if you were in the Foreign Service. I got the job of persuading the local bookstore, the only one that carried English language books, to carry about a dozen of his books for sale. I succeeded.

My other ambassadorial involvement was even stranger. The consul was leaving on home leave. My wife and I went to the airport to see him off. The entire consular corps was there; they were largely honorary consuls except for us and a Panamanian consul. The American consul, apart from not wanting to work, did not speak more than a half dozen or so words of Spanish, so I was taking care of things, standing in line for tickets and so forth. The consular wives had brought his wife a farewell orchid corsage. I watched the plane landing that he was to go out on. It was a little DC- 3 coming from Panama; it flew back and forth daily. It landed and I watch the people getting off. To my consternation there was the new American ambassador coming down the gangway. He was a political appointee, whose name was Capus Waynick. We had had no word at all that he was coming. I went over to the consul to say, “Look, that is the new ambassador coming, I'll finish what I am doing for you. I think it would be best for you to go and greet him. Make sure they do not put him in that little customs cage with iron bars.” (It was about 15' x 20' where everybody would be packed in while their bags were checked.) He went off and I went off and did the rest of the checking in for him. When I got back I found the consul did not know how to stop anything because he did not speak Spanish. I charged into the customs office and took the Ambassador's diplomatic passport. I explained the situation to customs and got him out. He was furious, not about this, but because no one was prepared for his arrival. He said, “But I told Pan American to let people know”. (Pan American was not much better then than it is now about a lot of things.) The Ambassador had a little bull terrier dog, which was very nervous and had been pregnant. On the plane coming down to Panama the dog gave premature birth to two puppies which, because of the oxygen problems in that altitude were in pretty poor shape. The pilot had radioed ahead to Panama, and Ambassador Waynick was met there by the head of Gorgas Hospital, or somebody close to the head. The dogs and the ambassador were rushed to the hospital to try to save the lives of the puppies, but the puppies both died. So the mother dog was nervous and the ambassador was furious. Unfortunately the ambassador had a four hour layover before he could go to Bogota; but fortunately the consul's wife had the presence to present her bouquet of

flowers to the ambassador's wife, who was much calmer than the ambassador was. The honorary Dutch consul invited them to lunch at his house.

Mary Ann and I had the privilege of taking the ambassador's dog to lunch. The dog came home with us. She was nervous as a cat, and kept trembling. I would take her out for a walk every three minutes, but nothing happened. Finally we took the dog down to the Dutch consul's place just before the ambassador was due to go out to the airport. At that point the dog exploded all over one of the consul's best pieces of upholstered furniture. So that was my experience with the ambassador.

I phoned the embassy in Bogota. It was around noon hour and nobody was there; there was a Rotary or Chamber of Commerce club luncheon and everybody was attending. I told the Marine guard, or whoever I talked to, that for God's sake he should get word to the DCM and others that the ambassador would be on the plane from Medellin and would arrive about three o'clock or so. I later heard that the message went into the luncheon room and was passed down the line to all of the embassy people there who got up one by one and walked out to get ready. So they at least got out to the airport to meet the guy.

Q: One thing that is sort of interesting to me is that the consul did not speak Spanish. In Medellin was that common, or unusual?

BRODERICK: He was unusual, he had come into the Foreign Service in 1923 or 1924, I think, prior to the Rogers Act even, and he had never progressed very far. He had spent ten or twelve years out in Shanghai before the war. He then served for a few years at a Mexican border post, Agua Prieta where he could have learned Spanish—but you know, he was one of these losers. At the time, after nearly thirty years in the Foreign Service, his rank was FSO-4. At the time of the 1946 Act he had been brought in as a FSO-4 and he had never been promoted. The year after I left he was finally selected out. He was not typical, thank God. But it was a very useful introduction as to how to deal with problem bosses.

One other story—the other vice consul was a staff corps officer, Phil Miner. The consul hated him. While the consul was on home leave, a very nice fellow from Senator McCarran's staff came down. This was shortly after the McCarran-Walter Act had been passed, which as you may recall, was a very stringent [immigration] law; nobody in the State Department liked it very much. When Joe McConnell arrived, Phil and I took a liking to him and took him out to lunch at the club. Phil also took him out to somebody's country home, and we just took good care of him for the three days he was there. As it turned out he had been treated pretty much like a leper everywhere else he had gone because of his connection to Senator McCarran, and of course he had been dealing with the ambassadors and DCM and people like that. So when he left he said, “Well you people have done right by me; if I can ever help you, let me know”. We thought, “Well that is what they all say”.

Several months later, I think it was just after the Eisenhower administration came in, the Department was RIFing [Reduction In Force] a whole bunch of staff corps officers and Phil got a notice that he was being RIFed. The consul was delighted at this. Phil said to me, “What am I going to do?” I said, “You had better write Joe McConnell a letter”, which he did. Two weeks later in comes a cable from State that “We regret the terrible misunderstanding and mistake that was made by some low-level clerk in personnel, Mr. Miner is not being RIFed, he is being transferred to Mexico City as assistant agricultural attach#". The consul said to me, “How do you suppose this might have happened?” I said, “I don't know, they must just have figured they could not afford to lose a guy with such talents.” That was Medellin.

Q: How long were you in Medellin?

BRODERICK: Just over two years. Shortly before my tour was up I had gotten word that my mother had had a cancer operation and was not expected to live very long. So I wrote to the Department to say that if it was possible I would like an assignment in Canada and they assigned me to Winnipeg. I was in Detroit on home leave and looking around for

winter underwear and then I got a call from Personnel, and they said, “Listen, the vice consul over in Windsor has just been selected out and he is leaving and we figure it is cheaper to assign you there than anyone else, so you are assigned to Windsor.” That was very nice. My mother died about six months later and it was a real privilege to be there during that period. I have always been grateful to the State Department for that.

Q: It has to be the least “foreign” assignment in the world. Did you live in Detroit?

BRODERICK: No, you were permitted to if you wanted to live in Detroit. We decided not to. First of all it was just inconvenient to get from a residential area in Detroit to Windsor. We had a son at that time and we would be over on weekends in any case visiting the grandparents and so forth.

Being in Windsor was interesting. It was a big visa mill. I was first the passport and citizenship officer and then visa officer. The general run of the mill stuff was pretty routine, but occasionally you would get some very interesting kinds of cases. I had a woman come in one day applying for an immigrant visa and on her application she said she had been born in Cleveland. I said, “You are an American citizen, aren't you? Why are you asking for a visa?” Her story was that she had been born in Cleveland, that her parents had come from the old Austro-Hungarian empire before the first world war. She was born in the early '20s in Cleveland and then the parents had decided to go back, perhaps during the depression. When they got back to their former home, what they used to know as part of the Austro-Hungarian empire was now Romania. They were not ethnic Romanians but there was a law in Romania requiring that by such-and-such a date you had to go down and inscribe yourself in a book at the local town hall. The act of doing that would make you a Romanian citizen. She was a minor, but her parents did it for her as well as for themselves.

As soon as the war ended she was fleeing Romania ahead of the Russian army and got to Vienna. She went into the American embassy there and asked for a passport. They said,

“No, you have lost your citizenship, because under the immigration law anyone who has accepted foreign nationality had to have reapplied for citizenship in the US before the age of twenty-one to stake a claim to American citizenship.

Well by 1946 she was twenty-three or so and therefor she was considered to have lost her citizenship; they made out a certificate of loss of nationality. This sounded awfully unfair to me and I started reading in consular texts, and other sources to see if there were not some way to overcome this presumption of loss. I discovered some court cases that dealt with the case of an Italian to whom the same thing had happened. The courts held that where there was a state of war in existence which prevented an individual from getting to an American consulate, provided that the person applied as soon as possible after the end of hostilities, citizenship was not lost. That was her case.

I documented all this and sent it in to the Passport Office, then run by the famous Mrs. Shipley. I thought I had come through with a very cogent, persuasive case. Their answer came back that this was a decision by a district court and unless it had been upheld by an appeals court, State would not recognize the precedent. So I talked to her again and asked about the others in her family. She said, “My brother is in the same situation, but with the additional complication that he, by force, was required to serve in consecutively, the Romanian, Hungarian and German armies.” That, of course, was another basis for losing US nationality. I asked, “What happened to him?” She said, “Oh, he has got his American citizenship by taking the bus across to Detroit and after the Immigration Service questioned him about this; they admitted him as a citizen. I said, “Well, my advice to you is to take a dime for bus fare and do the same thing.” I never heard from her again. I suspect that the Immigration Service may not have known all these details, but what the hell.

Q: You were there how long?

BRODERICK: About two and a half years.

Q: Your work was mostly various kinds of consular issues?

BRODERICK: Very much. Most of them were run-of-the mill. We did have some fights with the legal profession because we put up a sign to say that you did not need a lawyer to apply for a visa. The Detroit Bar Association was up in arms about this because some of them were making a lot of money; they would charge some people $150 to make out an application. They did not like to see this business melt away.

Q: Who was the famous Mrs. Shipley?

BRODERICK: She was known as “Ma Shipley” and had been head of the Passport Office for about thirty years, at the time, and was tough as nails. She was a strict interpretationist when it came to nationality cases. She was very popular with the conservatives in Congress like John Rooney [Representative from New York on the House Appropriations Committee] who used to pass on the Department's budget. She was always very well treated by John Rooney.

There is another story about Rooney. While I was in Windsor a man that none of us liked who had been on Senator Styles Bridges's staff was made head of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs. This was Scott McLeod, one of the former dog-robbers for the McCarthy types. He visited Windsor. On Congressional correspondence he was sound; he said, “Look, you guys get letters all the time from Congressmen and if you do not answer them properly I get in trouble with them. What you want to do is when you get a letter from a Congressman (it is almost always about a visa case) you start off by saying 'we are very pleased that you are personally interested in the case of John Doe'. The reason you do that is because that while the Congressman probably does not give a damn about the case of John Doe or his relatives, he always sends a copy of whatever letter you send him to the constituents. So don't understate his interest. Then you state what the situation is, but use a lot of words about how marvelous the Congressman is. The only exception to that rule is John Rooney. Rooney called me one day, he had gotten one of these letters,

and he said, 'What is all this crap about my personal interest? I don't give a damn about these people.' So don't write letters like that to him."

There is one other case I wanted to tell you about, a very sad case. I got this call from the Justice Department. This woman attorney said, "Did you issue an immigrant visa in Windsor in 1954 to John Palavchek (I'm not sure of the name)- -a Ukrainian?" I said, "Well, I have issued thousands of visas, and if you said I did, I guess I did." She said, "As a matter of fact, we have got the actual document here in front of us and your name is on it. We are investigating him and it turns out that he has been involved in some of these concentration camp crimes and the killing of Jews. The question is, when he appeared before you, did he tell you any of this?" I said I am sure he didn't as it would be grounds for refusal. She said, "Would you be willing to testify in court that if you knew the facts as we now believe they are he would not have been issued a visa?" I said, "Sure, I would be prepared to do that." I did not hear anything for another six or seven months. Then the same woman called to say, "We just called to tell you that you will not have to concern yourself about appearing in this case. We notified Mr. Palavchek two days ago that we were undertaking deportation proceedings against him and last night he committed suicide." That was kind of a shocker.

Q: I don't imagine you came across a lot of cases with ramifications like that?

BRODERICK: No, but we had strange ones; we had an English woman who came in, a youngish woman in her mid-'30s, married to an American citizen. They were living in Windsor, and he was teaching in Detroit. She had a British passport so she could pass back and forth as a visitor with no visa, but she wanted an immigrant visa. During the British general strike of 1926, her father was one of the working men on strike. During a big meeting where Lady Astor was addressing a crowd of strikers, she said, "If all of you love Russia so much, why don't you go there and I will pay your fare." Well, her father accepted this offer and he took his family to Leningrad and he worked in a tool and die

plant. (I can't remember if she was actually born in Russia or in Britain.) He died rather young, so the widow was left to raise these two small kids, the woman and her brother.

When the German armies came in, the mother took the girl—the boy may have been drafted in the Russian army by then—and in effect became a camp follower of the German army. Then the mother died and this girl, who was by then 19 or 20, became the mistress of a German medical officer and traveled back with him as the Germans retreated. All of this came out of files we had gotten from Germany where she had been in a DP [Displaced Persons] camp. Later she left the German and met the American and married him. He was in the military government at the time. The reason we got the information was that she had applied for a visa some place in Germany, and these facts were on file there. The concern in those early days was not the Russian background but the German connection—we were still mad at the Nazis. By the time she got to us, this was '54 or '55, the problem was the Russian connection because it turned out she had been a member of the Komsomol [Communist youth organization] and the Communist Youth Brigade and they had actually sent her to an intelligence school somewhere to train her to be a spy. So she was clearly ineligible under the McCarran- Walter Act; it was very complicated business interviewing her since usually her husband would be with her. But I did discover that she was very articulate and had lived for some years in Britain after coming out of Germany where she had made speeches to local clubs, womens' clubs, and given newspaper interviews about how terrible life was in Russia with these awful communists. By that time we had a so- called 'defector clause' in the law. I documented all of this stuff and said that she has established she is a defector by all of these speeches she has made criticizing the Russian government and therefore she has overcome the communist presumption. We got the visa for her.

We had another case of a woman who was again married to an American; she had been arrested once for prostitution, or soliciting, I forget which, in Germany before she had married this guy. I had to interview her about this, and she said, yes, she had a small child by her German husband, who was killed in the war, and she was starving and only did it

once, and so forth. I wrote to the Department and said there is this defector law for ex-Communists. Two questions are, a) how many times do you have to have been proven to do it before you are a prostitute and b) there is no similar status for the reformed prostitute. As I put it to them, under our law Karl Marx could conceivably qualify for a visa but Mary Magdalene couldn't. It did not help, it did not cut any ice, we could not give her a visa. So much for Windsor.

Q: Where was your next assignment?

BRODERICK: I came back to the Department for language and area training—Serbo-Croatian—and spent six months in Washington and a year at Berkeley. I started in January 1956. We studied the language here and had tutors out there while we studied politics and economics, history of the Balkans and things like that. It was a marvelous year. I thought I was going to be assigned to Belgrade directly but I was assigned to INR and worked on Yugoslavia for two years. It was disappointing to me at the time, but it was a very useful preparation for me to go to Belgrade.

I was disappointed the other day in talking to John Sprott, who is deputy director of the FSI, who said that they only have two people assigned to area training this year, that Personnel in its typical method of operation usually offers as candidates for area training people for whom they cannot find any other assignment.

When we went to Berkeley there were four of us for Yugoslavia, there were four others up at Harvard for the Russian area training and of course there were others for the Middle East and elsewhere. You mentioned history, and the need to know how things operate. If you don't know the language of Yugoslavia and if you don't know anything about its history, you are not very well prepared to deal with anything that is going on in the country.

Q: In INR what seemed to be the principal concerns of the US with Yugoslavia?

BRODERICK: This was a period in which we had been giving substantial aid to Tito after the break with the Russians in 1948 and we had provided huge military assistance as well as, under PL 480, economic assistance. The objective was to insure that Tito stayed separate from the Russians and at least followed kind of an independent foreign policy. It was getting harder because this was the era in which Khrushchev was trying to mend his fences. He came to Yugoslavia, a rather famous visit, and he did what King Henry IV did at Canossa [Italy, 1077]. He did not stand in the snow barefoot, but he publicly apologized; that was Tito's essential condition for his coming to Belgrade. He did his penance. Tito's instincts were always basically pro- Russian. He did not like the way the Russians wanted to treat Yugoslavia, but he was a born Communist and was suspicious of capitalists. So while we still had the aid program, relations were cooling to some extent.

One sidelight about INR—Tito took the leadership in developing a kind of “third force”—he saw himself and Nasser and Nehru as the potential leaders of the third force, of the third world countries who could do well by negotiating between the Russians and the Americans, do well politically and economically. One of the things I wrote in INR was a piece about Tito's travels, trying to analyze what he was seeking to do and whether he would be successful. It was a very straight-forward piece, but I gave it a title that I never thought would survive the clearance process. This was in the days when there was a television program called “Have Gun, Will Travel” and I titled this, “Have Heresy, Will Travel”. Remarkably everybody cleared it and more remarkably, some months later I ran a check on the CIA files to see what they had on Yugoslavia as I was writing a piece on the economy and discovered that this article was indeed in their files. They had catalogued this under “religion”.

We had another example of the cooling relationship, although they were still friendly. Three or four years earlier, during the Sixth Yugoslav Party Congress my predecessor in INR had been invited, this would have been in 1952, to attend the Congress as an observer. With the Seventh Party Congress coming up, through the embassy in Belgrade

we were trying to get me an invitation, but relations were not quite the same, so it took a long time. Finally reluctantly the Yugoslavs issued me a visa to at least go to Belgrade and I did have some kind of pass for the Congress, I think it was actually a press pass; I went up with our consul in Zagreb, Pete Rabenold to Ljubljana, where the Congress was being, and we were using these passes we had, trying to crash the Congress. We got into the press area, inside the building, but about the time we tried to get in the door into the actual Congress we saw the chief of protocol from the Foreign Office come up to us. He very diplomatically and skillfully told us that we had been previously misinformed, that we were not supposed to be where we were, much less in the Congress, and politely took away our passes and threw us out. So I never got to see the Party Congress in action.

George Kennan served as ambassador in Belgrade. Actually when I was in INR and when I first got to Belgrade, Karl Rankin was ambassador. Karl Rankin had been ambassador to Chiang Kai-shek for about five years. Even though his way of thinking about the world ran about parallel to Chiang Kai-shek the Department assigned him to Belgrade. He had wanted to be assigned to Greece where he had served before the war; he also had been in Belgrade as the commercial officer before the war. So he got Belgrade instead. He never liked the place and never got along with the Yugoslav hierarchy. While I was there at one point, the Yugoslavs were carrying on a big effort, as part of this third force campaign, to develop aid programs all over Asia and Africa with relatively limited resources. They would send out doctors and engineers in relatively small teams, and so forth. I think Rankin among others had expressed some concern that this was inimical to US interests and that we should do something to try to stop it. So I and a colleague in the AID office in Belgrade jointly looked into this and got all the information we could and wrote a piece, fairly lengthy, six or seven pages, in which our conclusion was that this is not a threat of any sort to US interests around the world. In fact, we said, there were ways that we could make use of what the Yugoslavs were doing in our own interests. This probably was an overstatement of what we could do with it, but anyway it had to go to Ambassador Ranking for clearance. I was petrified because I knew what his political outlook was. My office

phone rang one day and I picked it up and said, “Hello”. At the other end was said, “Rankin here, would you come down to my office, I have this dispatch you have written.” So I went down in fear and trembling. He said, “I would like you to take some notes as I go through this; here in the first paragraph you have used a semi-colon where you ought to have a comma, and you have used the word “presently” where I think you mean currently.” Well, we went through the whole thing like that while he corrected and improved my grammar and my style—there was not one word about the substance of thing, which he then signed and sent off to the Department where it sank without a trace, as most things sink there. So there was no threat to my position or to Rankin's position.

Q: It sank without a trace?

BRODERICK: That's right. The Ambassador called a meeting one day of the staff and said that all this business of language training, learning Serbo-Croatian was a real waste of time, where the heck could you use it except in Yugoslavia. If you wanted to study a language you ought to learn a useful language like French or German. There were about six of us there who were language officers. Then he said that he was a little worried that we were not staying well-informed in what was going on in the world and we should be doing more reading; he asked us to send him a brief report on the books we were reading or had read.

Q: Like going back to high school.

BRODERICK: I was a little upset with this. I read and reported to him on two books; one was a Yugoslav novel in English, a translation, and the other I had found in the Yugoslav bookstore [Yugoslovenska Kniga] The Further Adventures of Hyman Kaplan. I don't know if you know it?

Q: Sure.

BRODERICK: Well, it is hilarious and I had read the first volume years before, so I sent him the reports and never heard from him again.

Then Kennan came, fortunately. He had come on a visit a year before he was assigned as ambassador. He was attending a Salzburg seminar, and came down to Belgrade, perhaps to the Institute of International Affairs there. Our DCM, who was charg# at the time, Elim O'Shaughnessy, had served with him in Moscow. It was summer and almost everyone was away so O'Shaughnessy and his wife invited me and my wife to dinner with Kennan, Kennan's wife was not with him. Kennan loves to talk and he is a marvelous talker. He got going that night on all sorts of things which I will not repeat because they later showed up in his memoirs, but how he got PNGed from the Soviet Union and so forth. I thought that this is a fascinating man but I will never see him again.

Q: Could I just say for the record, PNGed means being declared persona non grata.

BRODERICK: But the following May he returned as ambassador. He told the story that he had been lecturing at Harvard; in the dean's office one day, a young undergraduate in a quavering voice said, “Mr. Kennan, the President of the United States would like to talk to you” and handed him the phone. It was John Kennedy asking him if he would be ambassador to Yugoslavia. He, of course, accepted, and came, and was very impressive, but very frustrated during the time he was there. He had great trouble trying to decide whether he was more furious with the Yugoslavs or with the US Congress. This was a period in which we were having things like boycotts of Yugoslav furniture which was being exported to the United States. The Croatian nationalist movement and the John Birch types were agitating against the Tito government. And Congress was sort of responding to this.

He was a pleasure to listen to. He is the only man I know who speaks the way he writes. You could take his speech down verbatim and it would look good on a page. He had lots of interesting stories. He also decided after he had been there a short while that there ought

to be some short manual you could give to new arrivals to the embassy which would tie in what they would see when they went around the country to the historical background of the country. For example there were some Roman ruins up the road from Belgrade at a place called Smederevo; there were the ruins of Diocletian's palace in Split; there was Dubrovnik, the Ragusa of the old days of the Venetian empire. So his first thought was to invite six or seven of us who were language officers up to his residence. He stood in front of his fireplace and we all sat at his feet while he developed this idea. He then wanted each of us to take one area and do it. I suggested that rather than do an area I would deal with the Yugoslav economy and try and tie it into visible monuments. Economics was not an area he was interested in, but he accepted this. As he talked he got more and more wound up in his subject and from being something that might have been a twenty or twenty-four page manual, it began to sound more like a doctoral dissertation. He said, “I can get my friend, Roman Jacobson, who is the Librarian at Harvard, to make his resources available”, and on and on like this. So we left sort of staggered.

Q: What was your position at the embassy?

BRODERICK: I was assigned to Belgrade as the head of the economic section. There was a titular head, but he also ran the AID program so I ran the economic section.

Q: How many were there in all in the economic section and AID?

BRODERICK: We had six or seven in the economic section, and a local staff of two that ran the commercial office. The AID mission was fairly substantial, maybe thirty professionals. It was mainly a technical assistance program, the idea behind it being that whatever technical skills we could develop in these Yugoslavs in various areas was a plus for the economy. Our real purpose was to expose them to a Western society, the United States or in some cases to Western Europe. They would bring that experience back and it would have in the long run, nobody knew how long, a kind of eroding effect on the system. It seems to have worked.

Q: We brought them to the United States?

BRODERICK: Yes. They would work in some field of agriculture or engineering or whatever. One very interesting story in that regard is with public administration. It was another area in which we were providing technical assistance. In the AID mission we had a man who had been a city manager in the States and was there on a two year assignment. He was choosing people to go to the United States. He chose one who was sent to Berkeley who got his master's degree in public administration, came back to Yugoslavia and was eventually mayor of Belgrade and just two and a half years ago was assigned here as Yugoslav ambassador to Washington. Sometimes there is a payoff.

Q: Was the AID program basically an exchange program, or were they doing other things?

BRODERICK: There was some financing, through the EX-IM bank, of diesel locomotives to upgrade the quality of their rail transportation. One of our intentions was that this would be a visible demonstration of US aid to Yugoslavia for the people to see. On one occasion we were on a train when the train stopped and the Yugoslavs—I wasn't with this group, but I heard the story—the Americans were talking with the Yugoslav officials and were saying that the Yugoslav people knew that the aid was coming from the United States and the officials were pooh-poohing it, saying that the general public were not even aware where these things come from. Well, the train stopped at a station and one of the peasants in the car was heard to say, “The Kennedys had to stop for a drink of water.” That is what they called the engines.

Q: How did Ambassador Kennan feel in regard to the rise of the Third Force movement that Tito was interested in?

BRODERICK: Well, he did not like it much; in fact during his tenure there was a big third world conference in Belgrade. Tito was the host. Kennan got very upset with Tito. I can't remember what the issue was, I think it was some commitment that Tito had made to him

about nuclear testing; right around that time the Russians had violated the test ban treaty or whatever agreement existed and Tito, who was supposed to say something critical about it, didn't. Kennan, who took a lot of things personally, got very upset with this and was quite testy in a press conference he gave. He was also quite critical of the Western press for reasons I can't recall right now.

The conference was kind of a Potemkin village operation; when the conference was going on you could all of a sudden buy the New York Herald Tribune at all the hotels in town, which was not available before that. They went around cleaning up the city and widening the streets. As somebody said, “If you stood still for twenty minutes on the street you would be painted green.” They made a big effort.

On the trivia side, there is the story that I want to tell about Elim O'Shaughnessy, who was a real character. Despite the name, he was a real Eastern Establishment traditionalist. He had been a bachelor for many years, but by the time he was in Belgrade he was married to a very nice wife; Mary Cutler was her name—the daughter of Robert Cutler who was one of Eisenhower's NSC staff. Anyway, O'Shaughnessy was planning to go to Trieste, and he said on the morning of this particular day to the political counselor, Oliver Marcy, who was a very emotional kind of guy, “Ollie, would you check and find out the name of the American consul in Trieste for me?” and Marcy said, “Sure”. At the end of the day Marcy came into his office and Elim said, “Ollie, did you get the name of the consul in Trieste?” Marcy had forgotten; it had gone out of his mind completely. He exclaimed, “Jesus Christ!” O'Shaughnessy shook his head slowly and said, “No, that does not sound like it.” That was the kind of dry humor he had.

Another story about O'Shaughnessy and his Eastern Establishment biases—in the embassy at the time was Andor Klay. I don't know if you have ever come across Andor, who is still in the Washington area—he was born in Hungary as was his wife. He came to the States in the early '30s or late '20s and worked for years and years in INR as the Hungarian analyst. In the Wriston days he became a FSO and was sent to Belgrade. Now

Andor spoke English fluently but it was accented. He and his wife, it was rumored, spoke to each other in Hungarian at home. He said after he got there he went to pay his courtesy call on Elim O'Shaughnessy who was charg# at the time. As Andor described it, “After I had been talking to Mr. O'Shaughnessy for only a few minutes, it became clear to me that as far as he was concerned I was entirely uncalled for”.

Q: How long were you in Yugoslavia?

BRODERICK: Three years. I was in the economic section, which I found very interesting. At the time I had wanted to be a political officer, but was assigned to economic section to my disappointment. After arriving in Belgrade, however, it became clear to me that politics in Yugoslavia was cut-and- dried, it was the economy that was interesting because that was where they were experimenting. Politically it was strict Marxist orthodoxy. They were developing things like workers councils, decentralizing management and all that sort of thing. So I enjoyed it immensely and decided that if I were going to be an economist in the State Department I had to learn something about economics and applied for University economic training. Just about that time we had a visit from a man who was a professor of economics at the University of Michigan, with Eastern Europe as his specialty. I asked, “What is the best place to do advanced economic training?” and he said, “Why not Michigan?” It sounded great to me so I applied and got it. I spent a marvelous year at Ann Arbor and was close to Detroit and all the relatives. It was not quite as nice as Berkeley had been because economics was quite a shocker to me, the discipline of which I was quite innocent. The first month I took an exam in a graduate course in international finance. When they passed out the papers and I read the questions my first reaction was, not only do I not know the answer to the question, I don't understand the question. Anyway it was an uphill struggle. I improved after that, and I was assigned from there to La Paz—which had not been high, or even low on my list.

Q: So that was 1963.

BRODERICK: Shortly after I arrived in July of '63 [Ambassador Douglas] Henderson arrived in November. What he was faced with even before he presented his credentials was a hostage crisis. The Bolivian miners' union was very militant, very leftist, led by people who probably did not in fact know what Communism was, but they acted like Communists. At this point, around Henderson's arrival, a group of Americans, two from USIA, two from the AID mission, and maybe the labor attach#, made a trip up to the largest tin mine, called Catavi. They, together with the Dutch mine manager, were taken hostage by the miners because the Bolivian government had just arrested the mine union leaders and thrown them in jail. They said, “Ok, you won't let our leaders out, we won't let these people out!” They put them in the second story of the headquarters of the mine, on the first floor of which were kept dozens of cases of dynamite. The threat was that they would blow the building up if anybody tried to rescue them. Henderson found this was the situation when he arrived there. When he presented his credentials to President Paz that was what he had to talk about, “What are we going to do about getting these guys out of the mines?” We were not proposing they release the arrested mine leaders, although I guess we would not have minded if they did. But we formed a kind of task force to deal with it. My job was to liaison with the Archbishop of La Paz, to keep him informed and to get the clergy to do whatever they could, which turned out not to be much. The only arduous part of that task was that the archbishop's palace was about seven blocks from the embassy uphill; everything in La Paz is up hill. Of course the elevation of La Paz is at 13,000 feet so four times a day I was climbing this hill and reporting.

The hostage crisis went on; this was also shortly after Johnson had become president and he was quite concerned, as he did not like to lose. There was discussion about sending in some Green Berets to rescue them. The idea was to bring them in helicopters at night and drop them. They would seize the headquarters and rescue the Americans. Then somebody raised the very interesting question of the altitude that would have to be flown by the helicopter to get in there, since Catavi is at about 15-16,000 feet and 20-21,000 to get over the mountains. The question was what is the load capacity of the helicopters you

have in mind at that altitude? It turned out to be two people. So that idea was dropped and we resumed diplomatic negotiations instead. The person principally charged with the care of these Americans was of course, the American consul in La Paz, Charlie Thomas, who today is our new ambassador to Poland. When the final agreement was reached, the final details of which I cannot even recall, Charlie went in with a jeep with a couple of others late at night. The hostages were brought out successfully and President Johnson was so delighted that they were all invited to come up to the White House for lunch. Air Force One was flown down and they flew back commercially. That was about the first of the many hostage crises we have had around the world, I believe.

One other thing that sort of relates to hostages; after the revolution of 1964 when the military took over, the army finally decided to clean up on the miners and try and make them dig tin instead of raise hell, so the army occupied the mines. This was May of 1965, just after our invasion of the Dominican Republic and there were a lot of rumors around that the US was going to send the Marines down to Bolivia too, to straighten that situation out once we got the D.R. organized. We did not much believe it, but you never knew what could happen in those days.

One time an AID-mission colleague and I were proceeding across the Altiplano towards a small village where a new potable water system was to be inaugurated. AID was financing the construction of these potable water systems around the country and Charlie Stevens and I were on our way to attend the dedication ceremony. It was also to be attended by President Barrientos and several of his ministers. We were standing at kind of a barren and dusty cross roads up on this high plain where the terrain was sort of rolling. The altitude was about 14,000 feet. All of a sudden in the distance we heard some music. We listened more closely, and what we were hearing was the “US Marine Hymn”. We looked at each other and said, “My God, maybe the Marines actually have landed! They are going to shake up Bolivia too.” The music got closer and closer—and it turned out to be the high

school band from a nearby village that was coming to play at the ceremony. We were relieved of the burden of the Marines, at least.

Q: Was AID a large part of the American effort there?

BRODERICK: It was very large scale. Apart from giving budget support, it was involved in financing highway construction, railroad rehabilitation, civil service development, banking reform, and tax collection efforts. We had a team from the Internal Revenue Service come down to try to help the Bolivian Finance Ministry improve its tax collection capabilities. The first suggestion was one that was as simple as it was efficient. The IRS said, “Look, anybody in this country who owns a telephone certainly has enough income to be paying taxes. What you do, Minister, is have your staff start calling everybody in the phone book and ask them when they filed their last tax return.” Which they did, and there was a huge influx of returns as a result of that effort.

On a different front, I was once talking to another Finance Minister about the fact that they had serious budgetary problems, budget deficit problems and I said, “You know, the monthly fee for a telephone in this country is about two dollars. Anybody who owns a telephone in this country can pay a lot more for it, and that would be a very good and easy source of revenue.” He looked at me and said, “Mr. Broderick, you don't understand, the people who own telephones are the ones who vote for us.” So they did not raise the rates.

Q: By and large, do you feel it was a successful effort?

BRODERICK: I am not so sure now. It would be interesting to have somebody go back twenty-five years later and assess what happened. It was successful to some extent. We did advance the construction of these highways down in the tropical areas. I fear that one thing that that effort did, among others probably more beneficial things, was reduce the cost of transporting coca leaf to the coconut processing plant, so that was not exactly a socially useful benefit.

I think the most effective programs were the ones that were closest to ordinary people. The one where we saw an immediate, positive impact was the development in Bolivia of the credit union. Typically a lower-class Bolivian, if he was short of money, had to go to usurers and they were charging 100% per annum, at best, for interest. Through the efforts, primarily of the Maryknoll Fathers who were in the country and one man named Fr. Joe Beausoleil, they developed a fairly extensive network of credit unions around the country, with very low capitalization. AID would put in $5,000 or so to get them started. Typically, when the Bolivians would decide to have a credit union, they would not trust any of their own to be in charge of it; they would have the local priest, or whoever the local foreigner was to manage the thing. Nonetheless, it became a very substantial source of short term capital. If a guy needed $100 to put a new roof on his house, he could do it at a 12% interest rate, which was practically a giveaway in those days.

They were also developing Bolivian handicraft industries and finding outlets for the peasants who would weave the rugs or make the serapes or wood products. AID was helping finance the marketing of it. We also brought down a team of agronomists, agricultural specialists from the University of Utah, and one of their first efforts was in the area of wool collection. We discovered that although there were five million sheep in the country (more than there were Bolivians), Bolivia was importing wool from Australia. We looked into this to find out why. We discovered that there was, in fact, a primitive collection effort of local wool, but the reason that it did not flourish was that these middle men, who had trucks, and would travel around the country and buy wool from the farmers, would pay a fixed rate, regardless of the quality of the wool. So there was no effort to upgrade the quality of the wool; then they would take the truck load and shovel some sand into it and sprinkle some water on it so it would weigh twice as much, and take it to the woolen mill. Well after once or twice, the buyers realized what they were buying and cut the price in half. It was just uneconomic. The first thing the AID people did was give demonstrations on how to shear sheep. They discovered that the typical Bolivian peasant regarded his sheep primarily as a store of value. It was just wealth to him. Secondly he would make his

own clothing as needed; then thirdly he would consider marketing it. That was lowest on his priority list because his shearing consisted of using an old tin can lid, or broken glass, and this of course, would cut the sheep up pretty badly. Naturally, at 14-15,000 feet many of the sheep would get pneumonia and die. so they knew shearing was a bad thing. The Utahans (they were all Mormons and were interesting people), gave these demonstrations. They would make clippers available to the peasants; they would teach them about grades of wool and the fact that if you developed a high grade wool you could get twice as much money for it. This proved to be very successful, and by the time I left Bolivia it was no longer importing wool. The question in my mind, is that still happening, or not? It could easily have fallen by the wayside.

There was a mining bank which had been set up in the 1940s to provide loans for small and medium private miners to help them work their mines. The government wanted AID to put some money in it to help capitalize it. We looked into it and discovered that 90% of the loans were delinquent, and that 90% of the loans had been made to people who had no mines at all. It was just used to be plundered. So we did make a loan to it, but we required a lot of changes to be made, there were conditions about who could get a loan and so forth. We trained staff, we had an American overseeing it, and presumably that worked for awhile, but when we left— who knows. So I am not sure how successful it was, how lasting it was. Bolivia today is substantially more advanced economically than it was then, though tin is no longer the major source of foreign exchange. It is coca, cocaine, and that is a real problem. To the extent that we eliminate the cocaine trade we send Bolivia back into a depression.

Q: After Bolivia you were assigned to Washington?

BRODERICK: I came back to Washington for two years as Deputy Director for Bolivia/ Chile affairs and then spent a year in a regional job. I was the Inter-regional Departmental Group Coordinator, where my primary job was overseeing the preparation of the annual

country policy papers, known as CASPs, which were a real pain in the ass, and largely disregarded, I think.

Q: These are the papers prepared in the field?

BRODERICK: Yes, by the embassies and sent in and reviewed by an interagency group that would make recommendations as to whether they should be changed or endorsed or whatever. I went from a year of doing that to the Senior Seminar in 1969 for a marvelous year. Then I went back to be director of the Office of Caribbean Affairs. I did that for two years. Then I went over to the FSI, first as the dean of professional studies and then as deputy director.

Q: When you were the director of Caribbean Affairs, what were the main issues?

BRODERICK: Probably the biggest one was bauxite—aluminum. This was the period in which we were facing the black power revolts in the Caribbean. There was an uprising in Trinidad which was put down just before I got there. There was an increase in the desires of these countries to nationalize whatever assets were valuable. Of course all the bauxite mines were owned by American or Canadian companies. The first expropriation was in Guyana, where the Prime Minister was planning to take it over but was amenable to an negotiation. Guyana had an unusual type of bauxite that was not used for making aluminum, but was used in making firebrick and therefor commanded kind of a premium on the market; it was not available anywhere else. That negotiation as to expropriation and compensation went on for quite a while. Arthur Goldberg was sent down as a mediator. The big producer there was ALCAN, the Aluminum Company of Canada. We were involved in it because there was a substantial American ownership in ALCAN. Right next door to Guyana is Suriname where another major American aluminum company, ALCOA, had major holdings. They were very concerned they might be next.

Jamaica was the largest bauxite producer. I think there were three or four American companies were there, so everybody was nervous. The negotiation with Guyana was

successful; both parties compromised to an extent that everybody could live with. But then the turmoil started to begin elsewhere. The one thing that was accomplished in my office at that time was that we developed and wrote the first policy paper on the subject of bauxite that anybody had ever done in the US Government. We were working with people in the E [Economic] Bureau who were minerals specialists. I think it was a very good paper on the subject in as much as nobody had ever worried about bauxite expropriation before. Subsequently (well after I had left Caribbean Affairs), the Jamaican bauxite holdings, Reynolds, Kaiser and others were nationalized, but I think they were all settled on terms satisfactory to the parties. Maybe our paper had some influence.

The other subject of concern the first year I was there was Papa Doc Duvalier [president of Haiti], who was alive but sick. Everybody was concerned about what would happen when Papa Doc died. The standard thesis was 'blood in the streets'. We did a contingency paper looking at the various alternatives, analyzing what could happen, what might happen and so forth. Our basic conclusion was that there would not be blood on the streets, there would be a fairly peaceful transition. It was kind of risky thing to say. However when he did die, there were all these contingency arrangements that the military had, including overflights to make sure the Cubans did not get involved and send troops in and so forth. But it was a very peaceful transition. I remember hearing the Under Secretary at the time, U. Alexis Johnson, when we were up in his office looking at the paper saying, “This is the first one of these things that ever came out the way it said it would”. We were quite pleased by that.

We had an ambassador in Jamaica, Vincent de Roulet, a political appointee; he was married to a woman who was the daughter of the owner of New York Mets, the horse racing family, Payson Whitney. They had both been heavy contributors to the Republican Party when Nixon came in, and Vincent de Roulet had decided he wanted to be an ambassador as a reward for his contributions. He made this known to the White House. Peter Flanagan, at the time, was in charge of these political appointees. He had told Flanagan that he wanted to be appointed to some place where he could take his yacht,

so it had to be a seaport. Flanagan called him one day and said, “Well Pedge” (which was his nickname), “how would you like to go to New Zealand?” That was not what he had in mind; what he had in mind was Lisbon or Rome or maybe Stockholm. He said, “Gee, I don't know, I have to talk to my wife” (All of what I am telling you was told to me by him.) “I will talk to my wife and see what she says.”

Well, three or four days later he called back and said, “Peter, we will take it”. And Flanagan said, “I'm sorry Pedge, you have got to move faster than that; New Zealand is gone.” “So what else have you got?” Flanagan said, “Well, how about Jamaica?” And he said, “I will take it.” So that is where he was as Ambassador.

He was there as Ambassador when I was assigned out of the Senior Seminar and he wanted to size me up so he had me come over and see him one day when he was in Washington. He said, “I want to explain to you what the office director's job is. When the ambassador decides there is something to be done in Washington, it is your job to see that it gets done back here.” I said, “You know, that is right, but it is only half right.” He said, “What is the other half?” I said, “When the ambassador decides that something has to be done, and it is decided that it is not going to be done that way, it is my job to tell that back to the ambassador.” He did not like that, but for a while, at least, he was polite to me. He was arrogant, rude, and really treated people very badly on his staff. He was also an out and out racist, so he was clearly in the wrong place, which he did not realize. He also had a pretty good sense of humor.

Q: He did not realize he was a racist?

BRODERICK: He might not accept that term, but he knew that he did not like black people very much. He thought he was in the right place. He did have influence. He had gone to school with Robert Haldeman [the President's aide] and at one point he had lobbied for a special aid program for Jamaica. He wanted about $10 million in emergency aid for one thing or another, and he took his proposal over to the White House and he pushed it

through over the AID hierarchy. Part of my job was to put together a team, to locate three people to go down to see what the problems were and how it was going to be spent. We worked quite well on that.

At one point, he got so arrogant that when he was back in Washington testifying to Congress on some point or another (this was after I left the office), he claimed that he had told the Jamaican government that if they dared expropriate the bauxite mines, or if one of those running in the Presidential election advocated the expropriation of the bauxite mines, he would make sure that that man lost the election. Well as soon as that got on the wires he was PNGed [declared persona non grata]. I think it was the only time a friendly government kicked out an American ambassador, to my knowledge. He did leave.

Q: You were backstopping a number of ambassadors?

BRODERICK: All of the Caribbean except Cuba, and Guyana and Suriname on the continent.

Q: Were those mostly career ambassadors, or political appointees.

BRODERICK: Let's see. Haiti, the Dominican Republic were career, Jamaica was political, Trinidad was political, Barbados was career, the Dutch Antilles, Curacao and Aruba, were not yet independent, we had a consul general there who was career.

Q: You mentioned when you talked about de Roulet that it would be your job to tell him things were not going to be done the way he wanted them. What was your relationship between Washington and the ambassadors, did you have to do that a lot?

BRODERICK: Not with career ambassadors. The other political ambassador we had was in Trinidad. He was also a racist. His wife was one of the Frick family, and she was the worst racist; when she would drink she would be just blatant about her feelings. He was a nice man, as opposed to de Roulet, sort of meek and mild. His son is running for governor

of Arizona today. Symington—a relation to the former senator, but not close. He was very pleasant but he was out of his field and out of his depth and I think he knew it. So he did not cause many problems or challenge the system much.

Q: So on issues of policy the ambassadors were not being told "no".

BRODERICK: No, but our ambassador in the D.R. [Dominican Republic] was Frank Meloy at the time, who was unfortunately assassinated later in Lebanon. He was a first rate career man. The only problems we had—we did not have problems with each other—but there was an effort by State (one of its periodic futile efforts), to reduce the size of agency staffs. We discovered that in the D.R. there were 22 people in one category or other, working for CIA. We tried to cut it down to about five. There were only three State political officers at the post, and all these weird agency folks scattered around. Our success was that we got the Agency to reduce it by two, I think. The party line was that these people are here watching Cuba, they are not dealing with the Dominican Republic. The CIA people are very elusive types to get hold of when you get into situations like that.

Q: After you left the directorship of Caribbean Affairs, what did you do?

BRODERICK: I went to the FSI [Foreign Service Institute]. Kissinger had developed this great system, great from his standpoint, whereby the State Department spent all of its time writing policy papers, called NSSMs (National Security Study Memorandums) while he ran the world. We did two; one was on Latin America overall, which I was involved in. One of the others involved in that was Brent Scowcroft, who at that time was a colonel whom I had known when he was a major as assistant air attach# in Belgrade. I was in charge of doing the one on Caribbean affairs. We worked for weeks and weeks and fought with various agencies, worked nights and Saturdays, and finally got the paper done on the first of August. I went up to Michigan on two weeks leave. As it turned out, when the paper was sent over to the NSC for review, Kissinger came to the paper and said, "I think this thing is too multi-lateral oriented; it has to have more of a bilateral flavor. Take it back and redo

it.” So my boss, Bob Hurwitch, called me in Michigan and said “You've got to come back and re-do it.” I came back and we rewrote the paper again. It turned out, Hurwitch later told me, that Kissinger had never read the paper, and he was not prepared to deal with it at the time, but needed some reason not to, so that was his reason. That made me so disgusted with the policy system that when a friend of mine asked if I would be interested in an assignment to the Foreign Service Institute, I said, “Yes, tell me more.”

So I got this assignment as dean of the School of Professional Studies and it was fascinating. It was one of the best assignments that I ever had. The first task that I found waiting for me when I got there was to develop a DCM [Deputy Chief of Mission—second ranking member of an embassy] seminar, to train people to work effectively as deputy mission chiefs. It was initiated at the request of the Director General, because in one year previously he had had a dozen or so DCMs having to be removed from their posts for various reasons. Some could not get along with the ambassador, some just could not manage, some had been charg#s for so long they did not want to let go when the new ambassador arrived, all this sort of thing. So I was instrumental—not in developing the course, we contracted with an outside management firm to do it—my task was to choose and deal with the contractor. We hired a consulting group some of whom were from the Harvard Graduate Business School, that had done a lot of similar jobs with the government. The orientation of the course was to be the case study method. What I did was first of all to go around the Department and talk to any number of former ambassadors and former DCMs, looking for cases as material that could be used in the course. These were then followed up by the professional team itself. We sent them overseas to talk to ambassadors and DCMs in the field to develop more case material. So it was a very relevant course, because it dealt with real problems people had found. It turned out to be very successful as far as content was concerned, not so successful in the beginning as far as participation. This was because, once again, everybody in the Foreign Service has a high opinion of his own abilities, usually justified, but also the tendency was for the classic DCM candidate, being a hot-shot political officer, to say, “I know all that stuff, and

don't need any training to do this". They were the ones who needed it the worst, usually. Also the embassies were saying, "Well, we need this guy out here yesterday, we can't wait two weeks". So part of the problem was, we would get the guys, or women, who were going out as DCMs to Uganda or Rwanda, or Chad or Paraguay, but we would not get those going to London or Rome, or even Buenos Aires, with some exceptions. Rozanne Ridgeway was one who went through the first or second course, and has done brilliantly ever since. I was very proud of that course. It still carries on. It has been much changed over the years. I am told that the Department is much more stringent about exempting anybody from taking this course so that most DCM candidates go through it.

Q: Some people regard the position of DCM to be the most difficult in the Foreign Service because of the various demands on it from many directions.

BRODERICK: It certainly can be. You have to have a very good feel for what it is your ambassador wants you to do, in the first place, and what he does not want you to do. Also, as in my dealing with Mr. de Roulet, you have to be able to tell the ambassador if you feel he is doing something wrong without offending him. Not the least important is to run the staff. Most ambassadors, quite properly, don't want to be the managers of the staff; that is the primary DCM function. This is where a lot of failures have come, from people who have made their careers by being brilliant analysts, very often loners. They have gotten on great with people, but the people they have gotten on with were the politicians in the British Labor Party or whatever, not in the embassy. So I think that we made a major contribution to improving our operations overseas.

The other area that I worked on was something in the mid-career area. We had over the years various incarnations of something called a mid-career course. I took it in 1957 before going to Belgrade. It ran anywhere from nine to thirteen weeks. But here again, the great problem was, that you need somebody in Personnel who can require people to go, as I was required to go. I tried to get out of it; everybody tries to get out of it. If it is not run

that way, what you get in the course are the bottom fourth of the Foreign Service, whom nobody would miss if they do not get to a post several weeks earlier.

My alternative in looking at this was, we should not try to do another long mid-career course and rely on Personnel to do what it ought to be doing, but develop a series of one and two week courses aimed at the political and economic officer mainly, but also for consular and administrative work. Assuming that a typical tour of duty in the Department was three years, over a three year period, the mid- career officer can have taken five or six of these courses that we were giving, providing background in the art of negotiation, use of computers, or labor problems in the underdeveloped world, or whatever. We developed these courses and again we fought, not with Personnel, but with the guy, for example, who was on the Bolivian desk that the world would not fall apart if he took a week off to take a course. We had intermediate success, but after I left that job they reinvented the longer mid-career course again, and it has fallen apart once more, for the same reasons. There may be no solution to this problem of getting the training to the people who need it.

That was a fascinating experience to me. I started my career as a high school teacher for two years before I came into the Foreign Service. I was more interested in this kind of assignment than most people in the Foreign Service. This was another problem; how to get very good people to serve on the FSI staff. They don't want to be in training jobs, they want to be operational. It was not easy, and we did not always succeed. But we did have some good training officers and they did do good jobs.

I spent a year as deputy director to Howard Sollenberger. The only thing that I took on there, other than over-all management, was overseeing the Diplomat in Residence Program for senior FSOs. That was nice because the responsibilities included picking the universities or colleges that these people would be sent to, which meant visiting the colleges and universities. I met some very interesting people—at Hamilton College, Occidental College, Allegheny College. We were looking for schools like that— the highly rated liberal arts colleges, rather than the big universities to put people in.

Q: This was what kind of program?

BRODERICK: Foreign Service officers spend one academic year on a university campus.

Q: It is "ambassadors in residence" but are they inevitably ambassadors?

BRODERICK: It was called in my day, "diplomats in residence" and usually they weren't ambassadors, but occasionally they were. It was supposed to be for people who would then come back to further career assignments. It has unfortunately been used as a sort of tombstone assignment for some.

Q: They would study and teach?

BRODERICK: Typically they would not study; they might take a course, but the assignment consisted of counseling individual students and generally teaching one workshop or seminar in an area of foreign affairs in which they have their greatest background. The assignment also involved working with the faculty in the international relations department or the history department, whichever.

Then in 1976 Ford Motor Company made me an offer that I could not refuse, and I took it. I retired June 30, 1976, was unemployed for seven days and went to work for Ford on July 8th. I worked for them for twelve years on their international activities. Initially I was involved with Latin American operations, but as time went on I was more and more involved with Ford's operations in South Africa. In fact the last three or four years was almost entirely devoted to that. I must say that it was a more challenging exercise in diplomacy in a lot of ways than I had in the Foreign Service. My last task was negotiating with the black trade union in Ford's South African manufacturing operation regarding the terms on which Ford would disinvest. The Ford board had laid down two requirements: one, that Ford would withdraw from South Africa in the sense of owning equity there,

but second, it had to be done in a way that was acceptable to the black South African community and the black labor force in the plant.

When this began, it was in February of 1986 and the instructions were “please have it all lined up in May of that same year.” May was when the annual shareholders meeting took place and Ford wanted to be able to announce it then. It in fact wasn't wound up until November of 1987. It was an excruciating experience, but we got an agreement that the black trade union accepted and the black political leadership found tolerable.

Q: You were doing work in the labor field in South Africa, what about in South America?

BRODERICK: It was labor relations by accident because my job title was director of international governmental affairs. Initially it was really sort of political risk analyst, “what is happening in Mexico that will affect Ford's operations, or in Brazil?” but as time went on I became more and more involved in operational aspects. When it came time for Ford to go through this pull-out there were several people, including a vice president, involved in these negotiations, but I had the assignment to deal primarily with the trade unions.

Q: When did you leave Ford?

BRODERICK: In June of 1988, a little over two years ago. I have been sitting around enjoying life there after.

Q: Thank you, Bill.

End of interview